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Unraveling the Mysteries of Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus 
 
[Announcer] This program is presented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, or MERS-CoV, is a novel coronavirus known to 
cause severe acute respiratory illness in humans; about 40 percent of confirmed cases have been 
fatal. Human-to-human transmission and multiple outbreaks of respiratory illness have been 
attributed to MERS-CoV, and severe respiratory illness caused by this virus continues to be 
identified. MERS-CoV was first reported in September 2012, and subsequent investigations 
documented illness onsets as early as April 2012. As of February 23, 2014, the World Health 
Organization has reported 182 laboratory-confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection, including 79 
deaths, indicating an ongoing risk for transmission to humans in the Arabian Peninsula. The 
median age of reported case-patients is 52 years. The range is 2 to 94 years; most case-patients 
are male. Most index case-patients have at least 1 reported chronic comorbid condition and have 
resided in, or recently traveled to, Jordan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, or Saudi 
Arabia. Confirmed cases of MERS-CoV have been identified in travelers returning from France, 
Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and Tunisia. Although some have speculated that a zoonotic 
reservoir of MERS-CoV exists, very little is known about the specific exposures that result in 
primary human cases. 
MERS-CoV infection causes severe acute hypoxemic respiratory failure, extrapulmonary organ 
dysfunction, and high rates of death; however, the spectrum of illness and clinical course are not 
fully defined. Evidence suggests that MERS-CoV is capable of limited human-to-human 
transmission, which results in outbreaks in family and health care settings. The 182 reported 
cases include multiple distinct spatiotemporal clusters and 32 identified infections in health care 
workers. Modeling performed to assess the extent of human infection and the transmission 
potential of MERS-CoV, as of August 2013, estimated that most symptomatic case-patients had 
not been detected but that chains of transmission were not self-sustaining when infection control 
was implemented. Despite evidence of human-to-human transmission, the number of contacts 
infected by persons with confirmed infections appears to be limited; sustained transmission in 
the community has not been documented. The Hajj, the annual religious pilgrimage to Saudi 
Arabia, involved 1.37 million pilgrims from 188 countries in 2013 but resulted in no reports of 
confirmed cases in the weeks after the pilgrimage. 
Little is known about the pathogenic potential and transmission dynamics of MERS-CoV. 
Although multiple health care-associated clusters have been identified, further investigation is 
needed of the specific risk factors for transmission within health care facilities. Basic information 
about the temporal and causal patterns of viral shedding and their relationships to clinical 
outcomes is critical to further understand the virus and to shape prevention and control measures 
needed to limit transmission. Standard, contact, and airborne precautions appear to be effective 
in limiting transmission and are recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
to manage known or suspected MERS-CoV infection in hospitalized patients as a primary means 
of preventing and controlling transmission. 
Potential animal reservoirs and mechanisms of transmission of MERS-CoV to humans remain 
unclear. Of the minority of case-patients for whom information is available about exposure to 
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animals, few have reported owning or visiting a farm with camels, goats, sheep, chickens, ducks, 
or other animals. A zoonotic origin for MERS-CoV was initially suggested by its high genetic 
similarity to bat coronaviruses and the identification of closely related viruses in bats.  
Recent reports have described additional data from camels. These include real-time reverse 
transcription PCR detection and limited sequencing of MERS-CoV from 3 camels from a farm in 
Qatar linked to 2 infections in humans in October 2013 and, more recently, in camels in Saudi 
Arabia. Additionally, antibodies against MERS-CoV have been detected in serum of camels 
from the Arabian Peninsula, including serum from the United Arab Emirates drawn in 2003. 
However, more epidemiologic data linking cases to infected animals are needed to determine 
whether a particular animal species is a host for the virus, a source of human infection, or both. 
The June issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases presents results of a study that provides evidence 
of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels in Egypt. Only 3 other reports of MERS-CoV detection in 
animals have been published: 1 in a bat and 2 in camels. However, these reports were based on 
limited genetic information. In contrast, on the basis of their sequence analysis of nearly the 
entire viral genome that showed more than 99 percent sequence identity with human MERS-
CoV, Chu et al. provide the most compelling evidence thus far of MERS-CoV infection in 
dromedary camels. Although the authors also found neutralizing antibodies to MERS-CoV (or a 
MERS-like CoV) in most of the camels, they did not find serologic evidence of infection in the 
abattoir workers who had contact with the infected animals. This finding leaves key questions 
about zoonotic transmission unanswered. Most notably, it remains unclear whether zoonotic 
transmission of MERS-CoV occurs between camels and humans and, if so, what the 
directionality and risk factors are for such transmission. These lingering gaps in knowledge about 
MERS-CoV emphasize the need for more epidemiologic study to determine risk factors for 
human infection, more population-level data on the prevalence of MERS-CoV in camels, risk 
factors for infection and shedding in camels, and continued vigilance for other possible sources 
of infection. Also, the camels tested were in Egypt and were locally reared or imported from 
Sudan or Ethiopia, countries in which no cases have been identified in humans. Thus, the 
geographic area for surveillance should be widened beyond the Arabian Peninsula and include 
eastern Africa, which is a source for importation of dromedary camels.  
This study emphasizes the need to further define exposure information for all MERS-CoV cases 
regarding camels and other animals, as well as exposure to ill humans who might have 
undetected MERS-CoV infections. Understanding the role of dromedary camels and possibly 
other animals in transmission of MERS-CoV to humans remains a priority for future 
investigation to enable development of targeted control measures and prevent future cases and 
deaths from this emerging pathogen. 
I’m Dr. Aron Hall, for Emerging Infectious Diseases, and I’ve been reading my co-authored 
commentary, Unraveling the Mysteries of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus. You 
can read the entire article online at www.cdc.gov/eid. 
If you’d like to comment on this podcast, send an email to eideditor@cdc.gov. 
[Announcer] For the most accurate health information, visit www.cdc.gov or call 1-800-CDC-INFO. 
